Assessing the Effects of the *Grundrisse* in Anglophone Geography and Anthropology

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Abstract: Selections of the *Grundrisse* were translated into English beginning in 1964; a full translation did not appear until 1973. Anglophone Marxian social science has changed dramatically since then; this article attempts to assess the role of the *Grundrisse* in these changes, focusing specifically on anthropology and geography. In geography the effects are most apparent in the work of David Harvey, who was among the earliest Anglophone social scientists to undertake a full reinterpretation of Marx in the light of the *Grundrisse*. I identify four insights that can be seen in Harvey’s writings and elsewhere in recent human geography, but whose relation to the *Grundrisse* is not often acknowledged. In anthropology, the effects of the *Grundrisse* are perhaps even more pronounced but also more complex and obscure; nonetheless, a similar, and similarly under-acknowledged, influence can be discerned, especially in historical anthropology and recent studies of value. I suggest that the *Grundrisse*’s translation into English has facilitated a convergence of anthropology and geography, and that critical ethnography in this vein is needed to grapple with the financialization of everything, in which commodification is only a preliminary step.

Keywords: commodification, critical geography, dependency theory, financialization, formalist–substantivist debate, historical anthropology, Karl Marx, political economy

The *Grundrisse* is the record of Marx’s mind at work, grappling with fundamental problems of theory. This is the manuscript’s most valuable distinguishing characteristic (Martin Nicolaus, in Marx 1973:25).

Introduction

The sesquicentennial of the notebooks now known as the *Grundrisse* is the event we are commemorating, but the reason we commemorate it is not really its age. After all, Marx spent most of his adult life generating notebooks. What matters for us now are the effects that these particular notebooks have had since their rediscovery not quite 70 years ago. Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright (this volume) have provided a wonderful account of the context and motivation of the writing of the notebooks (cf Rosdolsky 1977). I attempt here to assess what difference they have made since their translation into English beginning in 1964, more than a century after Marx finished drafting them.
Such an assessment is an unavoidably precarious undertaking. There is, first, the difficulty of characterizing Marxian social science circa 1973, which in retrospect appears both economistic and scientistic. In a handful of paragraphs in the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (published in German in 1859, just after the writing of the *Grundrisse*, and translated in 1904), Marx seemed to give strong causal priority to “the economic foundation” or “forces of production” (aka the base) over “the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms” of the “relations of production” (aka superstructure). Anything other than the material realities of production were not only secondary but also suspect as mere “false consciousness”. This economism was reinforced by the notion that Marx, in *Capital*, had revealed “scientific laws” of capitalism that were of a kind with the laws of mathematics or physics: deterministic and causal, at least in the proverbial “last instance” (see, eg, Althusser 1971; Mandel 1978 [1972]). Without expressly contradicting the Preface, the *Grundrisse* makes both of these positions difficult to maintain.

Second, as is well known, the *Grundrisse* was not written for publication, and it is highly uneven. Long stretches are obscure or tedious, but it is also punctuated with passages of luminous, even lightning-strike clarity. It might be easier to understand than *Capital*, but that isn’t really saying much, and it is also less gripping and cogent. In any case, the *Grundrisse* is not often cited outside of a relatively small circle of specialists, and its meaning cannot be derived separate from Marx’s larger corpus, especially *Capital*. The effects of the *Grundrisse*, then, may be expected to be more diffuse and difficult to demonstrate than is ordinarily the case. Not only are they likely to be second order—in the sense of having altered how people read Marx’s other works—but their traces may be further obscured by lack of citation and by the likelihood that people are reading Marx in ways that have been influenced by other people’s readings of the *Grundrisse*, without necessarily having read it themselves.

The *Grundrisse* is by no means the only reason, moreover, that Anglophone Marxian anthropology and geography look so different today compared with 40 years ago. Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks* (1992) and Lukács’ *History and Class Consciousness* (both translated in 1971) have also been extremely important in redefining the conceptual landscape and the agenda for research and action. Henri Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space* (published in 1974, translated in 1991) would further complicate the task at hand, except for the fact that Lefebvre modeled his book explicitly on the *Grundrisse* (Lefebvre 1991:66f).

With these caveats, my thesis is that the perspectives opened up by the *Grundrisse* were critical to enabling scholars to find fertile new directions in both disciplines. These are more easily discerned in geography due to the work of David Harvey, whose *The Limits to
Capital (1982) was one of the first attempts in English to reinterpret Marx’s corpus in light of the Grundrisse. In the first part of this article, I identify four insights that can be traced from the Grundrisse through Harvey’s voluminous writings, and that have also attained wider circulation in geography (and the social sciences more generally) in recent decades. (1) Humans and nature constitute a dialectical unity; their separation (both real and conceptual) is not a priori but historical and must be explained. (2) One’s categories are themselves historical, material products and Marx’s categories (eg value, capital, labor) are historically specific. (3) Relations and processes are not only real but also take priority over essences and things. (4) Production and reproduction must be understood together; because capital accumulation necessarily takes place in and through landscapes and peoples who may resist or fail to cooperate, commodification is an ongoing, never-completed process rather than an absolute condition.

In the second part I turn to the effects in anthropology, which are more indirect and obscure but perhaps even more pronounced than in geography. It can be argued, for example, that Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, an excerpt of the Grundrisse published in London in 1964, played a large role in the emergence of Anglophone Marxian anthropology, especially in the United States. The excerpt first entered debates among Marxist historians regarding modes of production (Asiatic, ancient, feudal and bourgeois); it served, for some, as strong evidence against Louis Althusser’s structuralist-determinist reading of Marx. Subsequently, Pre-capitalist Economic Formations informed dependency theorists’ inquiries into the articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist societies and the role of peasantries, and it helped end the vitriolic debate between formalists and substantivists in economic anthropology. Meanwhile, Maurice Godelier drew on the Grundrisse to develop a reading of Marx that pervades present-day Marxian anthropology. In recent years the Grundrisse has largely disappeared from anthropologists’ bibliographies, but its influence is widespread, especially in historical anthropology and in recent work on value.

In the conclusion, I suggest that although many of the older debates—over modes of production, base and superstructure, “early” versus “late” Marx, and formal versus substantive economic anthropology—now seem obsolete, their intellectual descendents in geography and anthropology are complementary and in many cases quite similar. They are perhaps best captured by Gillian Hart’s (2006) notion of “critical ethnography and relational comparison” and exemplified by monographs in both disciplines that emphasize processes such as capital flows and the contested, variegated dynamics of commodification through and across social space. Beyond “the commodification of everything” (Watts 1999), moreover, the Grundrisse can help us grapple with the financialization of everything, as value is increasingly embodied
in, and reproduced through, such intangible “things” as cultural symbols, digital information, ecosystem services or pollution credits.

I do not claim that the Grundrisse is the sole cause of the changes witnessed in Marxian geography and anthropology since 1973. Support for the insights I emphasize here can be found elsewhere in Marx’s corpus, and in the evolution of such broad disciplines no single text can operate unilaterally or unequivocally in any event. Nonetheless, the shifts I describe did not occur in the 30+ years after publication of The German Ideology (published 1932, translated 1938) or The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (published 1932, translated 1959). Moreover, illuminating the under-acknowledged effects of the Grundrisse is not merely an exercise in intellectual history. Perhaps it is ironic that Marxian geography and anthropology have flourished in new ways since 1964, while Marxist governments and political influence have withered in the face of globalization and neoliberalism. It would be too simple to assert a causal relation between the two, but it is nonetheless worth considering how a less mechanistic and dogmatic, post-Grundrisse Marxian theory might help revive the left’s practical and political significance today.

Effects in Geography

The full translation of the Grundrisse appeared in 1973, just as David Harvey was beginning the research that resulted, nine years later, in The Limits to Capital. That he was aware of and inspired by the Grundrisse from the very beginning is demonstrated by a book review he published in 1972, when only a small fraction of the manuscripts were available in English (see below). The book under review concerned ancient Chinese urbanization, yet Harvey saw fit to devote a full page to a summary of the Grundrisse’s implications for materialist historical analysis. And in a parenthetical note to start his discussion, he described the Grundrisse as “a work which has only recently become known and which departs in significant respects from the rather narrow and naive economism of many subsequent ‘marxist’ scholars” (Harvey 1972:510). Two years later, with the full translation in print, Harvey (1974) published an analysis of Marx’s method that fleshed out this assertion in greater detail.

I cannot here include a full analysis of the Grundrisse’s role in Harvey’s thought. Suffice to say that it is cited and/or discussed by name in every book he published in the two decades beginning 1982. In Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference, Harvey (1996) related his theories of space–time, capitalism, and social reproduction to the philosophies of Liebniz and Whitehead, but he obviously did not find them there first. His central claims seem more closely rooted in Lefebvre’s, and his own, readings of Marx in light of the Grundrisse. For
Harvey, as for Lefebvre, space–time is not simply absolute but relative and relational: it is socially and materially produced through processes of human (inter)action such as the movement of goods, people, ideas, symbols, capital and information. There is probably no other passage more closely associated with Harvey’s corpus and influence than this one:

The more production comes to rest on exchange value, hence on exchange, the more important do the physical conditions of exchange—the means of communication and transport—become for the costs of circulation. Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange—of the means of communication and transport—the annihilation of space by time (Marx 1973:524).

One can trace a direct line from the Grundrisse to “space–time compression”, which is probably Harvey’s (1989) most cited idea across the social sciences.

The full effects are much more complex than this, of course. Rather than attempt to explicate them in detail, however, I will confine myself to four points that can be traced from the Grundrisse through Harvey’s voluminous works, and thence into the work of other critical human geographers. By the end of this trajectory, we no longer need to find the Grundrisse cited or discussed overtly for its influence to be evident (especially by comparison to earlier strains of Marxist social science), provided we are attuned to notice it. In short, insofar as Harvey’s interpretation of Marx relies heavily on the Grundrisse—a claim that can scarcely be disputed—then it is plausible to suggest that Harvey’s influence on geography is one indication of the influence of the Grundrisse. It would be too strong to say that the Grundrisse has become mainstream, but many of its insights now circulate well beyond avowedly Marxist geography. In the second part of this article, I will argue that a similar sequence of citation–incorporation–non-citation has occurred in anthropology.

1. Humans and nature constitute a dialectical unity; their separation (both real and conceptual) is not a priori but historical and must be explained

In his introduction to Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, Eric Hobsbawm (in Marx 1964:12, emphasis in original) wrote that people labor “by operating in nature, taking from nature (and eventually consciously changing nature) for this purpose. This interaction between man and nature is, and produces, social evolution”. The passage that probably provoked Hobsbawm here was Marx’s observation that:

It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and
hence their appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process, but rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of human existence and this active existence, a separation which is completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and capital (Marx 1973:489).

Two years after *The Limits*, Harvey’s student Neil Smith (1984) made the unity of humans and nature a central premise of his critique of Alfred Schmidt and the Frankfurt School. Previously, the idea that Marx was a “Promethean” advocate of human “progress”, understood as a technologically enabled “domination of nature”, was widely circulated by Frankfurt School figures such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1972). Smith dismantled Schmidt’s interpretation of Marx and nature, pointing out that capitalist society does not and cannot dominate nature in any absolute way and that Marx was acutely aware of the conjoined exploitation of laborers and the earth.¹ Harvey (1996:131) later argued that in recent world history “it has been capital circulation that has made the environment what it is”, and critiqued strains of environmentalism that reinforce a static human–nature dualism by fetishizing “pristine” or “wild” landscapes over urban or human-inhabited ones. And in a recent essay, Harvey observes:

We have to understand how the accumulation of capital works through ecosystemic processes, re-shaping them and disturbing them as it goes... But the social side cannot be evaded as somehow radically different from its ecological integument... The circulation of money and of capital have to be construed as ecological variables every bit as important as the circulation of air and water (2006:88).

The notion of a “metabolic exchange” between humans and the environment has also been further developed, quite persuasively, in the work of sociologist John Bellamy Foster (2000).

2. One’s categories are historically material products and Marx’s categories (eg value, capital, labor) are historically specific

Another principle made plain in the *Grundrisse* is the historical specificity of Marx’s categories: not only that capitalism was historically unprecedented, but also that the very concepts through which Marx explored capitalism were historically conditioned and enabled. “[E]ven the most abstract categories, despite their validity—precisely because of their abstractness—for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations” (Marx 1973:105). Marx’s categories—value, labor, capital, the commodity—had now to be understood as grounded in, made possible by, and specific to the material circumstances of capitalist
society. They were not, therefore, universally applicable to any and all forms of human society.

This may seem obvious today, and it is abundantly supported in Capital (cf Harvey 1982; Postone 1993), but it was not widely acknowledged for much of the twentieth century, and only in the Grundrisse is the importance of this seemingly simple proposition clarified.

In the succession of the economic categories, as in any other historical, social science, it must not be forgotten that their subject—here, modern bourgeois society—is always what is given, in the head as well as in reality, and that these categories therefore express the forms of being, the characteristics of existence, and often only individual sides of this specific society, this subject . . . this holds for science as well (Marx 1973:106, emphasis in original).

Not only does this deflate the universal pretensions of any “scientific laws” in political economy (see Mandel (1978 [1972]) for an indication of earlier interpretations and Llobera (1979) for an historical account of their emergence) it also specifies the relation between the world and any attempt to apprehend it in thought, with priority placed on the actual, material world. “As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest possible concrete development . . . Not only the category, labour, but labour in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form” (Marx 1973:104). Abstract labor had come to be thinkable as a concept because it had come to exist in the actual world of human production. Such self-reflexivity obviously raises the issue of how to ground one’s categories in such a way as to explain the possibility of having them at all. “False consciousness” may apply as much to the critic as to anyone else in capitalist society, so one cannot claim to “see through” the illusions or “appearances” of the material world without also explaining how the material world can enable one to obtain such a vision. Moishe Postone (1993), who likewise draws heavily on the Grundrisse, refers to Marx’s method as one of “immanent critique”.

3. Relations and processes are not only real but also take priority over essences and things

Capital is not a simple relation, but a process, in whose various moments it is always capital (Marx 1973:258, emphasis in original).

The Grundrisse also makes plain that for Marx, things cannot be understood in themselves, as essences abstracted from context, but only in relation to other things and the totality of all things (cf Ollman (1971) for an important early exegesis in English of “the philosophy of
internal relations”). Most commentators have focused on the Hegelian influences in the *Grundrisse*, but Foster (2000) traces this epistemology to the pre-Socratic materialism of Epicurus and Lucretius (the subject of Marx’s doctoral dissertation), who conceived of flux and change as more real than static objects. Things are produced through processes, in which relations become manifest; as all things are ultimately ephemeral or subject to change, apparently “objective” characteristics or essences are less real than the processes and relations that produce them. For Harvey (1974), the power of the dialectical method, compared with both normative analytics and logical positivism, is its ability to explain how systems change from within—something of obvious importance for analyzing human–environment interactions. Harvey also stressed the importance of relationality: “Ideas are therefore regarded as social relations . . . [I]t follows that we can gain as much insight into society through a critical analysis of the relations ideas express, as we can through a study of society as object”. Similarly, Nicolaus (in Marx 1973:14) observes that money and capital each “signify . . . an entire system of social relationships based on certain rules and laws, and involving a certain type of politics, culture, even personality”. He went on to argue that this insight informed Marx’s emphasis on production: “If the society as a whole is to be grasped in motion, in process, it is first and foremost essential to comprehend the dynamics of the direct production process . . .” (in Marx 1973:31). 3

4. Production and reproduction must be understood together; because capital accumulation necessarily takes place in and through landscapes and peoples who may resist or fail to cooperate, commodification is a continuing, never-completed process rather than an absolute condition

Nicolaus is right to see the priority of production as a corollary of Marx’s relational-processual ontology. But this priority is not about the “forces” or technologies of production (“the base”) dominating over “relations” (the “superstructure” of ideology); rather, it refuses the distinction between “work” and “non-work” altogether:

The important thing to emphasize here is only that, whether production and consumption are viewed as the activity of one or of many individuals, they appear in any case as moments of one process, in which production is the real point of departure and hence also the predominant moment . . . The individual produces an object and, by consuming it, returns to himself, but returns as a productive and self-reproducing individual. Consumption thus appears as a moment of production (Marx 1973:94).

Production as a whole process is simultaneously reproduction of both the worker and the society of which s/he is a member. This is not a functionalist sense of (re)production, reducible to how humans survive

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as a species; rather, it treats *social relations* as every bit as real and material as tools, technology or the activities of labor. Thus, how commodified wage labor fits (or fails to fit) together with the non-(or less) commodified spheres of social reproduction becomes *part* of the study of production, not its marginalized or subordinated other.4

Feminist geographers have found here a fruitful ground for engaging and extending Marxian critiques of capitalism and globalization. Massey (1994) criticized Harvey, and political economists more generally, for neglecting the highly gendered division of labor that characterizes such spheres of social reproduction as the household, child rearing, and non-wage labor. Harvey (1996) subsequently endeavored to address this shortcoming, incorporating issues of gender, difference and the body, as well as the environment, into his analysis. Marston (2000) reiterated Massey’s critique through an analytic of scale, and Katz (2001:710) has persuasively argued that “Social reproduction is the missing figure in current globalization debates”. Emphasizing the dialectical unity of production and reproduction offers an important opening for bringing the state, the household, and civil society into Marxian political economy and critical geography.

In *The Limits*, Harvey focused on the implications for another “frontier” of commodification: landscapes and the built environment. Not only is fixed capital a significant sink for surplus capital; it also imparts an unceasing and unpredictable dynamic of investment and devaluation into the landscapes—urban and rural—that humans produce and occupy. Whether due to political opposition, unintended consequences or simple overaccumulation, the circulation of capital through landscapes and people is chronically prone to crisis and disruption. The point holds for commodification in general, as Jack Kloppenburg (1988)—also inspired by the *Grundrisse*—has demonstrated in his remarkable political economy of plant biotechnology.

Furthermore, the *Grundrisse* demonstrates that Marx’s focus on capitalism and political economy did not come at the expense of other fields of inquiry. Toward the end of his life he devoted significant time to reading proto-anthropological studies such as Lewis Henry Morgan’s *Ancient Society* and Henry Sumner Maine’s *Ancient Law*.5 After all, he could only construct categories adequate to capitalism by carefully distinguishing it from other historical forms of human society. Production in general could not suffice, for example, because it applies equally to all such forms:

Whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is always production at a definite stage of social development—production by social individuals ... *Production in general* is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction ... Still, this *general* category ... is itself segmented many times over and splits into different determinations.
Some determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few . . . nevertheless, just those things which determine their development, i.e. the elements which are not general and common, must be separated out from the determinations valid for production as such, so that in their unity—which arises already from the identity of the subject, humanity, and of the object, nature—their essential difference is not forgotten (Marx 1973:85).

To identify what set capitalism apart required a materialist analysis of the whole of human history, including evolution, tools, social organization and the means of production. In Hobsbawm’s words: “Though particular social–economic formations, expressing particular phases of this evolution, are very relevant, it is the entire process, spanning the centuries and continents, which [Marx] has in mind” (in Marx 1964:14). It is hardly surprising, then, that the Grundrisse sparked considerable interest among anthropologists.

Effects in Anthropology
The effects of the Grundrisse in anthropology are more indirect and obscure but perhaps even more pronounced than in geography. It can be argued that Pre-capitalist Economic Formations played a major role in the emergence of Anglophone Marxist anthropology, especially in the United States, but the route by which this occurred is a twisted and multi-stranded one. One strand passes through dependency and world systems theory, which borrowed both from Pre-capitalist Economic Formations and from earlier works such as Paul Baran’s Political Economy of Growth (1957) to study the articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist societies and the role of peasantry (cf Roseberry 1988). Another strand, originating more from within the discipline, was the debate between “formalists” and “substantivists” in economic anthropology, which revolved around whether categories developed in and for modern industrial society could be applied to non- or pre-capitalist settings (cf Graeber 2001). It appears that the Grundrisse helped end this debate, although political ecologists have been treading very similar ground more recently and might benefit from revisiting this antecedent. In recent years the Grundrisse has largely disappeared from anthropologists’ bibliographies, as have these debates. Its influence is pervasive nonetheless, especially in historical anthropology and in recent studies of value.

We tend now to associate the Grundrisse with the full-length translation published in 1973 by Martin Nicolaus. But parts of the notebooks appeared in English earlier. David McLellan translated 22 selections (totaling roughly one-sixth of the whole) in 1971 (Marx 1971), and in 1964 Eric Hobsbawm brought out Pre-capitalist Economic Formations (Marx 1964), a slender volume that was reprinted in England.
no less than four times (a separate American edition appeared in 1965). It included extracts from The German Ideology and a half-dozen letters by Marx and Engels, but the bulk of the volume was a long introductory essay by Hobsbawm and an excerpt of similar length from the Grundrisse, translated by Jack Cohen. Hobsbawm (in Marx 1964:9) explained that the notebooks had been published in Moscow in 1939–1941. “The time and place of publication caused the work to be virtually unknown until 1952 when the present section of it was published as a pamphlet in Berlin, and 1953, when the entire Grundrisse were republished in the same city . . . The Grundrisse are therefore the last major writings of the mature Marx to have reached the public”.

In both German and English, then, the earliest exposure of Western scholars to the Grundrisse was this section on “forms which precede capitalist production” (to use Nicolaus’ translation of the section heading). This is noteworthy mainly for its curious retrospective improbability: Today the introduction, with its meditation on method, is generally considered far more important (Hall 2003). Hobsbawm’s essay feels especially outdated, far more so than the excerpt itself. It takes one back to Cold War-era debates over the definitions of Asiatic, ancient, feudal and bourgeois modes of production, which Marxist intellectuals struggled to reconcile with the complex and diverse realities of societies around the world. The list and sequence of modes of production was well known from the Preface to the A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, and Pre-capitalist Economic Formations represented a much fuller exegesis than had previously been known from Marx himself. Presumably this is why the excerpt was chosen for separate publication.

If such debates now seem antiquated or obsolete, then the larger Grundrisse is itself a major reason for this. Hobsbawm (in Marx 1964:10) recognized the potential of the notebooks to change how people understood Marx. “It can be said without hesitation that any Marxist historical discussion which does not take into account the present work—that is to say virtually all such discussion before 1941, and (unfortunately) much of it since—must be reconsidered in its light”. McLellan (in Marx 1971:3) called the Grundrisse “the centrepiece of Marx’s thought”. Nicolaus (in Marx 1973:7) wrote: “The Grundrisse challenges and puts to the test every serious interpretation of Marx yet conceived”. Such testing and reconsideration has taken place since then (Hall 2003; Harvey 1982; Meaney 2002; Negri 1984; Postone 1993; Uchida 1988), but Pre-capitalist Economic Formations represented only the first steps in that direction—and rather oblique ones at that.

It should be stressed that I am not attempting to assess the effects of the Grundrisse among historians. Such a task is beyond the space available here. Hobsbawm clearly had this audience in mind in 1964, and the generation of Marxist British historians of which he is a part—including Maurice Dobb, Christopher Hill, George Rudé, E P Thompson

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and Raymond Williams—represents an important mediating force in the development of post-*Grundrisse* Anglophone Marxian social science (see, eg, Mintz 1984). Working from a more empirical and inductive point of departure, they saw the rise of capitalism not simply as a matter of “the laws of motion of capital” (Mandel 1978 [1972]) but as a fine-grained, quotidian affair, intimately embedded in the practical activities of ordinary working people and much more contingent in its logic and outcomes. This was an approach that Marx seemed to validate in the *Grundrisse*: far from a rigidly deterministic procession invoked as the *deus ex machina* of human history, Marx’s modes of production appeared here as conceptual tools, abstracted very self-consciously from a vast array of empirical information.

These historians drew directly and explicitly on the *Grundrisse*, especially in their (sometimes vitriolic) denunciations of Althusserian structuralism (eg Thompson 1978). Althusser had painted himself into a corner, so to speak. In order to valorize *Capital* as “science” on a par with mathematics and physics, Althusser (1971) had insisted on a strong break between the “early” and the “late” Marx, relegating the more overtly Hegelian earlier writings to relative insignificance. The *Grundrisse* made it abundantly clear, however, that Marx had in fact drawn very heavily on Hegel’s *Logic* in formulating his method for *Capital*—there was no strong break after all, or if there were, it would have to be defined in some other way.

This did not prevent Althusser’s work from influencing subsequent anthropology—far from it—but it did help to decouple the study of capitalist social relations from the rigidly deterministic framework that had prevailed in mid-twentieth century Marxism. This was particularly important when anthropologists encountered dependency and world systems theory, alloys of an earlier Marxism (eg Baran 1957) and Latin American radical political science. As William Roseberry notes, Althusser’s interpretation of two concepts—modes of production and social formation—became central to radical anthropology on the “underdeveloped” world. However:

In their diffusion through journals and the practice of fieldwork, such concepts often became unhinged from the structuralist philosophy of Althusser himself and were applied to concrete problems of historical and current development. In these more practical applications, the mode of production concept offered the possibility of a more differentiated understanding of capitalism than did the extreme versions of dependency and world-systems theory . . . [R]ather than subsuming all parts of the world within a global capitalism from the 16th century onwards (as both Frank and Wallerstein had done), scholars working within a mode-of-production perspective saw a more prolonged and uneven transition to capitalism. The incorporation of regions within colonial or mercantile empires did
not necessarily impose upon those regions the laws of capitalist development (Roseberry 1988:167–168).

The very idea of a Marxist anthropology had been considered, at least among English speakers, a risible absurdity (Godelier 1984:56). The peoples anthropologists studied were presumptively understood to be timeless and primitive, isolated from all things modern, let alone from capitalism. In Sidney Mintz’s (1984:13) words, “it is really because of the curiously nonhistorical or ahistorical character of these [Anglophone] anthropologists that Marxist thinking was for so long of no interest to their practitioners”. “The charter of American anthropological legitimacy”, he continues, “was an overwhelming concentration upon the past, and a determined separation of the people being studied from the modern industrial society in which they lived, from which they could hardly escape, and to which they were clearly subject” (1984:15). By the 1980s, Mintz (1985) and his long-time collaborator Eric Wolf (1982), among others, were producing influential works that bore strong marks of this new, post-Grundrisse sensibility regarding capitalism.

Try as they might, anthropologists could not avoid the issue of capitalism impinging upon “primitive” societies, especially as international development rolled out during the Cold War. As economists were deployed to “develop” the so-called third world, issues of social and cultural dispositions and compatibilities became acute. By the mid 1960s, a heated debate had developed over how to proceed in what had come to be known as economic anthropology. It boiled down to which should take conceptual priority: the “economic” side of the interdisciplinary union or the “anthropology” side. Proponents of the former were known as “formalists”, while those of the latter were known as “substantivists”. As George Dalton, a prominent substantivist, wrote: “Almost all the communities anthropologists study in the field are now experiencing some degree of economic, social, cultural, or technological change as parts of newly independent nation-states bent on ‘modernization’ and economic development” (1969:64). To what extent, he asked, should anthropologists “adopt conventional economics as the conceptual language with which to analyze primitive and peasant economies”? The formalists accepted the tacit claim of conventional economics that its concepts—such as scarcity, maximizing, and surplus—were universally applicable; the substantivists demurred, drawing on the work of Karl Polanyi to argue that “the differences between primitive economic organization (i.e., where market transactions of resources and produce are absent or present only in petty amounts) and our own are so great that a special set of concepts, leading ideas, and terms are necessary to analyze these subsistence economies” (Dalton 1969:65).
It might seem that the *Grundrisse* would favor the substantivists because of Marx’s insistence on the historical specificity of conceptual categories. But in a context of obvious interaction, how then to deal with the capitalist elements of the encounter? In the end, it appears the *Grundrisse* had the effect of defusing the debate by undermining the dualism that defined it. Dalton’s article, published in *Current Anthropology*, provoked commentaries that include some of the earliest citations of the *Grundrisse* in Anglophone anthropology. Ronald Frankenburg, writing from Lusaka, asked why *Pre-capitalist Economic Formations* had not been discussed in Dalton’s piece. Zbigniew Marcin Kowalewski, of Poland, cited the 1953 German edition of the *Grundrisse* in his remarks, noting that “capitalist economic relations, which penetrate into even the most ‘isolated’ peasant community, are regulated within the community by their own mechanisms”, such that “economic relations with the outside world may have a capitalist character even though economic relations within the society are pre-capitalist” (Dalton 1969:85).

Scott Cook, one of Dalton’s main adversaries, did cite *Pre-capitalist Economic Formations* and the *Grundrisse* in his rejoinder, and in so doing he appears to have helped bring the debate to an end. Cook (1969:380) called Marx “the most astute and profound of all substantivist economic thinkers”, yet went on to insist that he was also a formalist—that he had “wisely argued for the application of (and himself applied) the concepts of formal economic theory to the study of peasant and feudal (ie non-industrial, non-capitalist) economies”. Cook called for cultural geography, archaeology and economic anthropology to come together in a “substantive formalism” that would rest heavily on the Marx of the *Grundrisse*. This Marx had

rejected as superficial the thesis that the market mechanism is a motivating, causal, or fundamental factor; he recognized ... that the market is merely a device to co-ordinate the various moments of a process more fundamental than exchange, namely production ... Economic anthropology can, I submit, move beyond its present theoretical impasse by following Marx’s precedent in positing production as the core of the economic process and as the analytical key to isolating economically relevant phenomena, and in employing the dialectical method to approximate economic reality (Cook 1969:382).

Cook’s main target in the debate between formalists and substantivists (which he described as “an enervating ... sectarianized polemic”) was not Dalton but Polanyi, under whom Dalton had studied, and in this respect the debate may yet have something to offer to present day geography. Noel Castree (2007) has argued that recent work in political ecology draws theoretical inspiration primarily from two sources: Marx and Polanyi. Cook argued that such a synthesis was impossible.
Polanyi and his followers were haunted by the ghost of Engels, he wrote, unable to recognize that Marx’s critique of capitalism was fundamentally different. Their substantivism was “spurious”: “Polanyi ... never recognized that the materiality (ie the substantiveness) of the economic field must be sought in production rather than in the amorphous concept of ‘embeddedness’” (Cook 1969:385).

No self-described “substantive formalism” emerged to fulfill Cook’s call. But by effectively rejecting both sides of the debate, a new kind of Marxist anthropology emerged that did embrace several of Cook’s main points. It was generally understood more as the product of a debate originating in France, however, over structuralism and Marxism. Jonathan Friedman (1974:444) remarked early on that this debate had “led to the incorporation of important elements of structuralist analysis into a more sophisticated marxist approach based on the ‘model’ developed in the *Grundrisse*”. The structuralism Friedman had in mind was not that of Althusser, however, but that of Claude Levi-Strauss. Here the work of Maurice Godelier, who had trained as an economist before becoming an anthropologist and working as an assistant to Levi-Strauss, is of central importance. Like David Harvey for geography, Godelier spread a *Grundrisse*-inflected Marxian approach in anthropology so effectively that its origins now pass largely unremarked.

Godelier’s corpus is too large to review here; I seek only to establish that his approach relied on the *Grundrisse* and that it has gone on to influence Anglophone anthropology in pervasive and enduring ways. Ironically, one of his most influential early papers in English (Godelier 1978) took as its point of departure “the distinction between infrastructure and superstructure”—a decidedly pre-*Grundrisse* framing that owes more to Althusser than to Levi-Strauss. Yet Godelier’s argument undermined the hierarchical and dualistic assumptions of earlier debates about the “superstructure”. “To my mind, a society does not have a top and a bottom, or even levels. This is because the distinction between infrastructure and superstructure is not a distinction between institutions. Its principle, rather, is one of a distinction between functions” (1978:763). The confusion arose, he wrote (765), because in capitalist society it happens that functional and institutional distinctions do coincide. Elsewhere they might not, such that institutions formally excluded from “production” in capitalist society, for example kinship, might be functionally part of a non-capitalist society’s relations of production.

Godelier defined “infrastructure” as including all of the following: “1. The specific ecological and geographical conditions within which a society exists and from which it extracts its material means of existence. 2. The productive forces, i.e., the material and intellectual means that the members of a society implement ... to work upon nature and to extract from it their means of existence ... 3. Social
relations of production” (1978:763, emphasis in original), including those determining access, ownership, allocation and distribution of resources, means of production, people and goods. By definitional fiat, Godelier dissolved conventional distinctions between “forces of production” and “relations of production”, “base and superstructure”, “material” and “ideological”, “economy” and “culture”. He did not directly cite the Grundrisse in his article, but at least one American anthropologist, asked to write a commentary to be published alongside it in Current Anthropology, noticed the influence immediately:

The work is “revisionist” in the best sense of the word: It revises Marx by rediscovering Marx. Its originality lies in a return to origins, to the Marx of the Grundrisse and the Philosophical Manuscripts, to the Marx of questions and not just answers . . . The recent trend toward a more flexible Marxist approach in the social sciences suggests that a new era is dawning in Marxist studies, a time of “paradigm” reevaluation. If so then Godelier must stand as one of the major intellectual midwives of this new era, if only on the basis of this short, brilliant piece (David Gilmore, in Godelier 1978:769).

Just six years later, Godelier repudiated “the naïve view of infrastructure and superstructure” that had prevailed earlier. “[T]he explanatory capacity of this metaphor is very limited”, he wrote (1984:37, 42). Instead, he focused on social relations of production, understood as comprising all three parts of infrastructure as he had defined it. “For me, now, Marxism is not a theory of production. It is a theory of production of society, not a theory of production in society” (1984:44). He noted that “capitalism does not generate capitalism everywhere”, and that “ideas are not only reflections, they are conditions or part of the conditions of the production of social reality” (1984:49, 50). Finally, Godelier summarized materialism as “Marx’s central claim that, in the last instance, the production of social forms is determined by or through the transformation of the relationship with nature. My understanding of Marx is that you cannot produce a new form of society without transforming this relationship with nature” (1984:55).

I have reviewed the various strands of post-Grundrisse Anglophone anthropology very briefly here, and I recognize that many other details and emphases might be warranted. I hope to have demonstrated, in any case, that the Grundrisse helped open new paths for historical anthropology as the study of the complex expansion of capitalist social relations. More recent examples are too many and too diverse to review here. They would include, for example, anthropologies of nature and the state in Venezuela (Coronil 1996, 1997), of international development in Lesotho (Ferguson 1985, 1990), and of conservation in Papua New Guinea (West 2006). Studies of commodification and commodity flows through space and time have proliferated and extended in many
directions, including works that make no mention of the *Grundrisse* but have absorbed and reworked, to a greater or lesser degree, insights that can be traced back to it along various paths.

On a more theoretical note, it remains to consider recent anthropological efforts to understand the category of value anthropologically. Foundational works include Fred Myer’s *Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self* and Nancy Munn’s *The Fame of Gawa* [which Harvey (1996) has treated in an essay on the social construction of space and time]. Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis, for our purposes, resides in the work of Terence Turner, which until recently was scattered across a score or more articles and unpublished manuscripts. Fortunately, it has recently become more accessible through the work of David Graeber (2001) and others of Turner’s former students.

Discussing commodities, Marx wrote in the *Grundrisse* that:

> Value is their social relation, their economic quality . . . As a value, the commodity is an equivalent; as an equivalent, all its natural properties are extinguished . . . commodities as values are different from one another only quantitatively; therefore each commodity must be qualitatively different from its own value (1973:141).

This rather difficult passage lies near the conceptual center of commodity fetishism: how things can both express and mask social relations while reducing humans to objects. The anthropology of value explores this paradoxical process in the only sites accessible to direct observation: the activities of people. Stephen Sangren, in a *festschrift* in honor of Turner’s retirement, writes that “value is best understood in relation to society conceived of as an integrated totality of productive activities” (2006:122). Graeber argues that:

> What has passed for “materialism” in traditional Marxism—the division between the material “infrastructure” and ideal “superstructure”—is itself a perverse form of idealism . . . The *actions* involved in the production of law, poetry, etc., are just as material as any others . . . [W]hat we take to be self-identical objects are really processes of action (2006:70).

Such an approach is a logical extension of the insight that production should be conceived as social reproduction. Capitalist value is a historically unique form of value, but it remains but a subset—and a contested one at that—of the purposes and aspirations that motivate human actions.

The anthropology of value combines several of the insights and themes found in post-*Grundrisse* geography: a relational and processual ontology; self-reflexivity about one’s categories and their material basis; and an emphasis on the complex and variegated dynamics of commodification as an ongoing process. It adds to these a commitment
to ethnographic methods—which have become more prominent in geography in recent decades—and it brings anthropology’s longstanding interest in the social production of space and time to bear on contemporary settings where capitalism is far from an undisputed or normative fact of life. It is unsurprising, then, that Marxian anthropology and geography have witnessed a convergence in interests, methods, and research subjects in recent decades.

I have endeavored to show that the *Grundrisse* played a major role in enabling this convergence to occur. It helped break up the rigid dualisms and determinisms of twentieth-century Marxism; awakened geographers to a more anthropological sense of space and time; and helped open anthropology up to historical and political economic approaches to its traditional subjects. If many of the debates that preoccupied Anglophone Marxism 40 years ago now seem obsolete, the translation of the *Grundrisse* should be recognized for its role in bringing this about.

**Conclusion**

(To be further developed, the influence of the transformation of all relations into money relations: taxes in kind into money taxes, rent in kind into money rent, military service into mercenary troops, all personal services in general into money services, of patriarchal, slave, serf and guild labour into pure wage labour) (Marx 1973:146).

The appearance of the *Grundrisse* in English beginning in 1964, in particular the passages concerning “forms which precede capitalist production”, was critical in dislodging the “techno-economic determinism” and “unilineal evolutionism” that had dominated interpretations of Marx since the turn of the century (Llobera 1979). In Lefebvre’s (1991 [1974]:102) words, “Less rigour, less emphasis on logical consistency, and hence a less elaborate formalization or axiomatization—all leave the door open to more concrete themes, especially in connection with the (dialectical) relations between town and country, between natural reality and social reality”. It must be stressed, however, that this does not make the *Grundrisse* (or *Capital*) less scientific; rather, it indicates that given the complexity of the subject of inquiry—namely, human society in relation to the natural world—a dialectical materialist approach is more appropriate and powerful than the methods typically associated with “science” (Foster 1999; Harvey 1974). Moreover, in view of the growing recognition among natural scientists of the dialectical nature of biophysical processes (Levins and Lewontin 1985), and current attention to complexity, emergent properties, non-linear dynamics, and problems of scale in “complex adaptive systems” (cf, eg, Gunderson and Holling 2002), the *Grundrisse* should help to open further paths of convergence between the social and natural sciences (Sayre 2005).
It is with regard to method that the *Grundrisse* is likely to play its most important roles at the present time, however. Marxian Anglophone geography and anthropology are converging on a shared problematic: how to understand the complex interactions of humans and processes of capital—commodification, circulation, valorization, accumulation and devaluation—through and across socio-natural space. If, as Michael Watts (1999) contends, the present time is one of “the commodification of everything”, then this problematic is clearly an enormous one, reaching around the world and producing extremely diverse and uneven outcomes. Gillian Hart’s (2006) notion of “critical ethnography and relational comparison” captures well the approach that is needed to grapple with these realities. Hart emphasizes the Lefebvrian character of her arguments, but as noted above, Lefebvre modeled *The Production of Space*—both the book and the concept—on the *Grundrisse* and the conception of production Marx developed there. The approach Hart advocates involves “using intensive ethnographic studies” at multiple sites in order to enable a non-positivist understanding of generality. In this conception, particularities or specificities arise through *interrelations* between objects, events, places, and identities; and it is through clarifying how these relations are produced and changed in practice that close study of a particular part can generate broader claims and understandings (2006:995–996, emphasis in original).

Such an approach is increasingly important as processes of commodification find ways to embody value not only in objects, goods, bodies and land but also in such intangible “things” as cultural symbols, digital information, ecosystem services or pollution credits. Exactly where, how and by whom such values are produced can be difficult to discern, but they are increasingly linked—and often conjured into being—by financial interests and instruments that represent a kind of second-order commodification. As Robertson (2006) has shown for the emerging market in ecosystem services, these interests may not even need to produce an actual biophysical result in order to realize the value they seek: these commodities are not so much fictitious as they are imaginary or fantastical. Yet their social and environmental impacts and implications are quite real. This is by no means an isolated example, and insofar as financialization is a defining characteristic of the present neoliberal period (Harvey 2005), such imaginary commodities are likely to become increasingly important. The financialization of everything greatly increases the speed, distance and magnitude of capital flows, which is of critical importance as alternative means of social reproduction are gradually eroded or abruptly eviscerated. After all, the absence (or disappearance) of capital can be as powerful in its effects as its presence (or arrival) ever was (Ferguson 2006).
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Endnotes
1 Although it remains unclear how to deploy “the production of nature” without simultaneously recapitulating a human/nature dichotomy (cf Harvey 1996:138), Smith’s exegesis of uneven geographical development and the “production of nature” has had a pronounced impact on geographers’ efforts to apprehend the environment in Marxian (as well as Lefebvrian) terms.
2 Anthropologist Bridget O’Laughlin put the point in simpler terms just two years after the full translation of the Grundrisse appeared: “Scientific knowledge of the world is apprehending the essential determinations and suppressing the unimportant. Since the material world is constantly and irreversibly changing, the significance of particular theoretical categories and questions will change as well” (O’Laughlin 1975:343).
3 Anthropologists, too, quickly recognized the epistemological implications: “Structural regularities are always processual and should be conceptualized as such in understanding any particular concrete historical situation ... Society cannot be understood as a population or aggregate of individuals, but only as a totality of social relations” (O’Laughlin 1975:345f).
4 See also Mintz (1985) for an important anthropological example of studying production and consumption as a dialectical unity.
5 Marx’s “ethnological notebooks” appeared in 1972, triggering discussion among intellectual historians (see, eg, Kelley 1984). The notebooks undoubtedly gave anthropologists reason to revisit Marx, but the Grundrisse was far more important in shaping the course of subsequent theory and research. See below.
6 It occurs at pp 471–514 of the Nicolaus translation, where it is one paragraph longer than in Cohen’s translation.
7 Graeber proceeds to develop a specifically geographical interpretation of the transformation of slavery into capitalism: removing and relocating workers from their sites of social (re)production to other sites of production was a necessary condition for exploitation, whether such relocation was singular and permanent (eg the middle passage) or repeated daily (eg commuting).
8 As Graeber (2006:70–71) remarks: “it is in the nature of systems of domination to take what are really complex interwoven processes of action and chop them up and redefine them as discrete, self-identical objects—a song, a school, a meal, etc. There’s a simple reason for it. It’s only by chopping and freezing them in this way that one can reduce them to property and be able to say one owns them”.

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